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This article analyzes the shifting concepts of law in Western law and 
thought in early modern times and today. It first shows how the modern 
movement of interdisciplinary legal studies emerged as a corrective to the narrow 
positivist concepts of law that prevailed before the 1960s. It then shows how, in 
anticipation of modern methods, earlier Protestant legal thinkers had already 
worked hard to reconcile biblical and human laws, natural and positive laws, 
canon and civil laws, cases and legal codes in pursuit of a more integrated 
jurisprudence. 
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“The jurists are still trying to define the law.” 
    -- Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781) 
“Few questions concerning human society have been asked with such 
persistence and answered by serious [legal] thinkers in so many diverse, 
strange, and even paradoxical ways as the question ‘What is law?’” 
     -- H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) 
These two quotations -- by the leading German philosopher of the 
eighteenth century and the leading English jurist of the twentieth -- might surprise 
some readers of this volume.  One would think that jurists would have a decided 
advantage over theologians, scientists, and philosophers in defining law.  Law, 
after all, is their specialty, and it has been for a very long time.  A special 
professional class of jurists has been at work in the West for more than two 
millennia.  Separate faculties of law have been in place in Western universities 
for nearly a millennium.  Distinct systems of civil law, canon law, and common 
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law have been operating side by side in the West for almost as long. 
Comprehensive national codes of public, private, penal, and procedural law have 
been in place for some two centuries.  Substantial international conventions, 
covenants, and treaties are now emerging on various global legal issues.  Surely, 
after all this time and experience, one would think that Western jurists would 
have worked out a clear, crisp, and concise definition of law.  But the exact 
opposite is true. Just because of its lengthy pedigree and just because of its 
sprawling complexity, the law studied by jurists has always resisted easy 
definition and universal conceptualization.  Jurists have thus, for many centuries, 
depended on theological, philosophical, and scientific teachings on law for 
inspiration and instruction.  
In the two centuries between Kant and Hart, many Western jurists worked 
hard to break themselves of this traditional interdisciplinary dependence and to 
establish law as an autonomous scientific discipline.  Their effort was part and 
product of the new positivist theories of knowledge that were sweeping over 
Western universities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – theories 
that were designed, in part, to replace earlier epistemologies that gave law, 
theology, and philosophy a much more prominent place.  Positivism aimed to 
subdivide all of human learning into a series of discrete scientific disciplines and 
to reduce each discipline to its most basic inner logic and method.  Traditional 
disciplines that had no distinctive core logic and method would have to be 
abandoned or subsumed.   
In law, the turn to positivism proceeded in two stages.  The first stage was 
scientific.  Inspired by the successes of the early modern scientific revolution, 
from Copernicus to Newton,1 jurists in Europe and North America set out to 
create a method and concept of law that was every bit as scientific and rigorous 
as that of the new mathematics and the new physics.  This scientific movement 
in law was not merely an exercise in professional rivalry.  It was an earnest 
attempt – even a desperate attempt in some universities -- to show that law has 
an autonomous place in the cadre of positive sciences, that it could not and 
should not be subsumed by theology, philosophy, government, or political 
economy.  In testimony to this claim, later eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
jurists poured forth a staggering number of new legal codes, constitutions, 
encyclopedias, dictionaries, textbooks, and other legal syntheses that still grace, 
and bow, the shelves of our law libraries.  
The second stage of the positivist turn in law was philosophical.  A new 
movement—known variously as legal positivism, legal formalism, and analytical 
jurisprudence—sought to reduce the subject matter of law to its most essential 
core.  If physics could be reduced to “matter in motion” and biology to “survival of 
the fittest,” then surely law and legal study could be reduced to a core subject as 
 
1 See the chapters herein by John Polkinghorne and Jörg Hüffner. 
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well.  The positivist formula was produced in the nineteenth century—most 
famously by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin in England and Christopher 
Columbus Langdell and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in America.  Law, they said, 
is simply the concrete rules and procedures “posited” by the political sovereign 
and enforced by the courts. Many other institutions and practices might be 
normative and important for social coherence and political concordance.  But 
they are not law.  They are the subjects of theology, ethics, economics, politics, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and other humane disciplines and social 
sciences.  They stand, as John Austin put it, beyond “the province of 
jurisprudence properly determined.”2  
This positivist theory of law, which swept over many Western universities 
at the turn of the twentieth century, rendered legal study increasingly narrow and 
insular.  Law was simply the political sovereign's rules.  Legal study was simply 
the analysis of the rules that were posited, and their procedural application in 
particular cases.  Why these rules were posited, whether their positing was for 
good or ill, how these rules affected society, politics, or morality were not relevant 
questions for legal study.  By the early twentieth century, it was rather common to 
read in legal textbooks that law is an autonomous science, that its doctrines, 
language, and methods are self-sufficient, that its study is self-contained.  It was 
common to think that law has the engines of change within itself; that, through its 
own design and dynamic, law marches teleologically through time “from trespass 
to case to negligence, from contract to quasi-contract to implied warranty.”3  
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was an early 
champion of legal positivism, and he used it to rebuke traditional legal theories 
that privileged Christian and other religious theories of law.  We have now 
entered into a new “age of faith in law,” Holmes declared, to replace an earlier 
age of faith dominated by the church and the clergy.  The confession of this new 
age of faith is that society is “ruled by laws, not by men.” Its catechism is the new 
case law method of the law school classroom.  Its canon is the new concordance 
of legal codes.  Its church is the courtroom where the rituals of judicial formalism 
and due process yield legal truth.  Its church council is the Supreme Court which 
issued its opinions with as much dogmatic confidence as the divines of Nicea, 
Augsburg, and Trent.4  
 
Holmes rebuked traditional views of law with a series of aphorisms that 
are still often quoted today.  Against those who insisted that the legal tradition 
was more than simply a product of pragmatic evolution, he wrote: “The life of the 
law is not logic but experience.”  Against those who appealed to a higher natural 
 
2 See esp. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Being the First of a Series of 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, or, The Philosophy of Positive Law (London: J. Murray 1861-63. 
3 Barbara Shapiro, "Law and Science in Seventeenth-Century England," Stanford Law Review 21 
(1969): 728.   
4 Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 41-67. 
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law to guide the positive law of the state, Holmes cracked: “There is no such 
brooding omnipresence in the sky.”  Against those who argued for a more 
principled jurisprudence, Holmes retorted: “General principles do not decide 
concrete cases.”  Against those who insisted that law needs basic moral 
premises to be cogent, Holmes mused: “I should be glad if we could get rid of the 
whole moral phraseology which I think has tended to distort the law.”5 
 
Despite its new prominence in Western legal circles, legal positivism was 
not without its ample detractors.  Already in the 1920s and 1930s, sociologists of 
law argued that the nature and purpose of law and politics cannot be understood 
without reference to the spirit of a people and their times—of a Volksgeist und 
Zeitgeist as various German jurists put it, building on the earlier insights of the 
historical school of jurisprudence developed by Otto von Gierke and Friedrich 
Karl von Savigny.  The legal realist movement of the 1930s and 1940s used the 
new insights of psychology and anthropology to cast doubt on the immutability 
and ineluctability of judicial reasoning.  The revived natural law movement of the 
1940s and 1950s saw in the horrors of Hitler’s Holocaust and Stalin’s gulags, the 
perils of constructing a legal system without transcendent checks and balances.  
The international human rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s pressed the 
law to address more directly the sources and sanctions of civil, political, social, 
cultural, and economic rights.  Critical Marxist, feminist, and neo-Kantian 
movements in the 1960s and 1970s used linguistic and structural critiques to 
expose the fallacies and false equalities of many traditional legal and political 
doctrines.  It was this swelling tide of “diverse, strange, and even paradoxical” 
perspectives on law that H.L.A. Hart was lamenting in the introduction to his 
monumental tract on The Concept of Law.6 
Spurred on by Hart, a number of distinguished jurists – Harold Berman, 
Lon Fuller, Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Hall, David Daube, and others – began to 
return to a broader interdisciplinary concept and definition of law. The efforts of 
the late Harold J. Berman from 1950-2000 were particularly powerful, and his 
chapter in this volume provides a crisp distillation of his views.  Of course, 
Berman and other critics said in concurrence with legal positivists, law consists of 
rules—the black letter rules of contracts, torts (delicts), property, corporations, 
criminal law, administrative law, constitutional law, and sundry other familiar legal 
subjects.  Of course, law draws to itself a distinct legal science -- a distinct 
method of analysis, argument, and adversarial dispute resolution, a distinct 
 
5 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1881), 1; 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J. dissenting); Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Letter to Sir Frederick Pollock 
(May 30, 1927),” in Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of 
Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874–1932, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 1941), 2:200.  See further Albert W. Alschuler, Life Without Values: The Life, 
Work and Legacy of Justice Holmes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 1.   
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manner of moving from principle to precept, from precedent to prescription, from 
evidence to judgment.   But, as Berman’s chapter argues, law is much more than 
the rules of the state and how we apply and analyze them in concrete cases.  
Law is also the social activity by which certain norms are formulated by legitimate 
authorities and actualized by persons subject to those authorities. The process of 
legal formulation involves legislating, adjudicating, administering, and other 
conduct by legitimate officials.  The process of “legal actualization,” as Berman 
calls it, involves obeying, negotiating, litigating, and other conduct by legal 
subjects.  Law is rules, plus the social and political activities and processes of 
formulating, enforcing, and responding to those rules.   
While rules sometimes do get formulated and posited by a sovereign, 
often times that comes after a long and gradual social process: habits become 
patterns, patterns become customs, customs become rules, rules become 
statutes, statutes become codes, codes become constitutions, constitutions 
become universal declarations.  Numerous other institutions, besides the state, 
are involved in this legal process.  The rules, customs, and processes of 
churches, colleges, corporations, clubs, charities, and other non-state 
associations are just as much a part of a society's legal system as those of the 
state.  Numerous other norms, besides formal legal rules, are involved in the 
legal process.  Each person’s legal activities of ruling and obeying, arguing and 
defending, negotiating and judging are shaped by a complex blend of personal 
attributes – their class, gender, culture, experience, virtue, ideology, bias, faith, 
and more.  
Legal positivism could not, by itself, come to terms with law understood in 
this broader sense.  After 1970, Western jurists thus began to (re)turn with 
increasing alacrity to the methods and insights of other disciplines to enhance 
their formulations.  This was the birthing process of the movement of 
interdisciplinary legal study that now dominates Western law schools.  The 
movement was born to enhance the province and purview of legal study, to 
refigure the roots and routes of legal analysis, to render more holistic and 
realistic our appreciation of law in community, in context, in concert with other 
disciplines.  In the 1970s, a number of interdisciplinary approaches began to 
enter the mainstream of the legal curriculum—combining legal study with the 
study of history, philosophy, economics, health, medicine, politics, and sociology.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, new interdisciplinary legal approaches were born in 
rapid succession—the study of law coupled with the study of anthropology, 
literature, race, environmental science, urban studies, women's studies, gay-
lesbian studies, and more.  And, importantly for our purposes, the study of law 
was also recombined with the study of religion, including the very Christianity that 
legal positivists like Holmes had sought to banish from the study of law.   
Christians and other religious scholars who study law and religion today 
focus on the religious dimensions of law, the legal dimensions of religion, and the 
interaction of legal and religious ideas and institutions, norms and practices. 
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They believe that religion gives law its spirit and inspires its adherence to 
tradition, ritual, and justice.  Law gives religion its structure and encourages its 
devotion to order, organization, and orthodoxy.  Law and religion share such 
ideas as fault, obligation, and covenant and such methods as ethics, rhetoric, 
and hermeneutics.  Law and religion also balance each other by counterpoising 
justice and mercy, rule and equity, discipline and love.  This dialectical interaction 
gives these two disciplines and dimensions of life their vitality and their strength.  
 
To be sure, the spheres and sciences of law and religion have, on 
occasion, both converged and contradicted each other.  Every major religious 
tradition has known both theonomism and antinomianism -- the excessive 
legalization and the excessive spiritualization of religion.  Every major legal 
tradition has known both theocracy and totalitarianism -- the excessive 
sacralization and the excessive secularization of law.  But the dominant reality in 
most eras and most cultures, many scholars now argue, is that law and religion 
relate dialectically.  Every major religious tradition strives to come to terms with 
law by striking a balance between the rational and the mystical, the prophetic and 
the priestly, the structural and the spiritual.  Every major legal tradition struggles 
to link its formal structures and processes with the beliefs and ideals of its 
people.  Law and religion are distinct spheres and sciences of human life, but 
they exist in dialectical interaction, constantly crossing-over and cross-fertilizing 
each other.7 
 
The three chapters, beyond Berman’s, gathered in this “legal studies” 
section of the volume focus on one small corner of this new field of law and 
religion study: namely, the place of law in the Protestant tradition, particularly the 
Lutheran (Evangelical) and Calvinist (Reformed) traditions.  This is a neglected 
subject – and rightly so, it would seem.  After all, Martin Luther’s most famous 
legal acts were burning the medieval canon law books, condemning jurists as 
“bad Christians,” and dividing Law from Gospel.  His most famous political act 
was to divest the Catholic Church of its vast power, privilege, and prerogatives 
and to place all this rather perilously in the hands of magistrates.  A number of 
later Protestant groups in Europe and North America repeated Luther’s example, 
eventually transmitting their views to African and Asian colonies as well.  Various 
Anabaptists went further and withdrew themselves from society altogether, and 
called for a “wall of separation” between church and state, religion and politics, 
conscience and law.  Given these realities, even sympathetic scholars have thus 
tended to pass over historical Protestantism in favor of the legal teachings of the 
 
7 See esp. Harold J. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion (Nashville, TN: Abingdon 
Press, 1974); id. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); id., Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and 
Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993).  See samples of later 
views in John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, eds., Christianity and Law: An Introduction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); id., Modern Christian Teachings on Law, 
Politics, and Human Nature, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).  
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Bible and the Church Fathers, of sundry medieval Catholic and neo-scholastic 
canonists and philosophers, and of various modern Christian legal thinkers and 
political movements.  
The reality, however, is that the Protestant tradition -- while legally and 
politically weak in many quarters today -- has long made monumental 
contributions to Western ideas and institutions of law. The sixteenth-century 
Protestant Reformation itself was a reform of both church and state, theology and 
law.  Its leaders were not only great theologians but also great jurists.  Protestant 
theologians and jurists worked together to craft new laws and polities.  For every 
new Protestant catechism in the early modern era there were a hundred new 
legal ordinances, for every fresh confession of faith, fifty new bills of rights.  Early 
modern Protestants believed in law – as a deterrent against sin, an inducement 
to grace, a teacher of Christian virtue.  They also believed in the rule of law – 
structuring their churches and states alike to minimize the sinful excesses of their 
rulers and to maximize the liberties of their subjects.  They extended their legal 
reforms to marriage, charity, and education as well, making fundamental legal 
changes that continue to influence us today.  And they engineered new 
experiments in federalism, civic republicanism, human rights protection, and 
social contract theory that remain at the heart of Western liberalism, albeit now in 
secularized forms.8  
Early modern Protestants built these reforms of law, politics, and society 
on the strength of new jurisprudential theories of law and authority, justice and 
equity, rights and liberties, codes and constitutions.  These theories are the 
special focus of the chapters that follow by Christoph Strohm, Mathias 
Schmoeckel, and the undersigned.  Together, these three chapters address four 
main questions of law that occupied Protestants from the sixteenth to nineteenth 
centuries.  
One critical question, raised early by Luther, was the place of the Mosaic 
law in Christian churches, states, and societies. This had been a perennial 
question of Christian theology, as several other chapters in have already shown.9  
 
8 This is the thesis of my volumes, Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran 
Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); The Reformation of Rights: Law, 
Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007).  See also the monumental studies of Christoph Strohm, Calvinismus und Recht (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2003); Mathias Schmoeckel, “Metanoia: Die Reformation und der Strafzweck der Besserung,” in 
Reiner Schulze, et al., eds., Strafzweck und Strafform zwischen religiöser und weltlicher 
Wertevermittlung (Kempten: Rhema, 2008); id., “François Connan (1508-1551), das Synallagma 
und die Föderaltheologie,” in Bernard d’ Alteroche, et al., eds., Mélanges en l’Honneur d’Anne 
Lefebvre-Teillard (Paris: Éditions Panthéon-Assas, 2009), 963-89. 
9 See the excellent chapters herein by Konrad Schmid, Michael Welker, Patrick Miller, Gregor 
Etzelmüller, and Christiane Tietz. 
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But it was raised with new urgency in early Protestant communities that resolved 
to live “by the Bible alone” (sola Scriptura).  Christ said he had come not to 
“abolish” the law, but to “fulfill” it (Matt. 5:17), and both Christ and St. Paul offered 
many examples of how to live by the spirit and letter of the law.10  But what then 
was the place of the 613 commandments of the Torah for modern day 
Christians?  The Church Fathers and medieval Catholics had divided the Mosaic 
dispensation into “moral laws” (like the Decalogue) that were still binding, 
“juridical laws” (like rules of tithing or sanctuary) that were merely instructive, and 
ceremonial laws (on diet, sacrifice, and temple life) that were now dispensable.  
Were these divisions still apt, and if so, what Torah commandments went into 
what category?  Professor Strohm lays out the range of Protestant theological 
answers to these questions from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries – from 
early rejections of the Mosaic law in favor of the Gospel to gradual 
accommodations of its enduring moral and juridical lessons for church and state 
alike.  Professor Schmoeckel and I further show how Protestant jurists made use 
of Mosaic laws as illustrations and applications of the law that God has “written 
on the hearts of all men” (Rom. 2:14-15).   
This raised a second question for Protestants: what is the law of nature, 
and how can we Christians be sure of its contents – especially given our inability 
as sinful creatures to read clearly the law written on our hearts or even rewritten 
in Scripture.  Protestants knew the traditional formula taught by medieval 
Catholics: that the natural law gives all persons an innate or natural knowledge of 
good and evil (called synderesis), that by exercising their reason persons can 
come to understand the norms of this natural law, and that by exercising their 
conscience they can learn to apply these norms equitably to concrete 
circumstances.  But they also recognized that, throughout history, persons and 
peoples had reached very different formulations and applications of the natural 
law, as had various Protestants and Catholics in their own day.  Protestants 
wanted more certainty about the contents of the natural law. They found it by 
comparing biblical laws with Roman laws, civil laws, canon laws, customary laws, 
and more.  If all these legal systems independently embraced the same legal 
teachings, they concluded, that had to be evidence of the natural law in action.  
Early Protestant natural law theories thus became exercises not only in 
biblical exegesis but also in comparative legal history.  Particularly Lutheran 
scholars like Philip Melanchthon and Johann Oldendorp and Calvinist scholars 
like Theodore Beza and Johannes Althusius wandered freely over all manner of 
sources in search of common natural law principles and precepts.  They 
published legal handbooks that put side-by-side various biblical and positive laws 
on sundry legal topics.  On the strength of these collections, Melanchthon and 
Althusius early on worked out elaborate theories of natural law that integrated 
these sundry sources: my chapter herein analyzes Althusius’ contributions.  John 
 
10 See the chapters by Mathias Konradt and Michael Welker herein. 
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Calvin, too, developed an intricate new Reformed law for Geneva by sifting 
through biblical laws and rabbinic jurisprudence, Roman law and medieval 
civilian lore, canon law and scholastic philosophy, as well as local feudal, 
manorial, urban, and customary laws in search of what he thought was the most 
equitable and expedient formulation of any given legal topic.  For Calvin, the 
Bible trumped when it gave clear direction.  But Calvin, who was a well trained 
jurist, knew the Bible was no modern legal code that solved all modern legal 
questions.  On many legal topics, a more eclectic and elaborated interpretation of 
core biblical principles and sundry positive laws was needed.   
This gradual development of a “demonstrative theory of natural law,” as 
Danish Protestant jurist, Nicolaus Hemming called it,11 helped to answer a third 
question that sharply divided Protestants: the place of Catholic canon law in 
Protestant communities.  In the centuries before the Reformation, the medieval 
Catholic Church had claimed a vast jurisdiction -- literally the power "to speak the 
law" (jus dicere) for Western Christendom.  It claimed personal jurisdiction over 
clerics, pilgrims, students, the poor, heretics, Jews, and Muslims.  It claimed 
subject matter jurisdiction over doctrine and liturgy; ecclesiastical property, polity, 
and patronage; sex, marriage and family life; education, charity, and inheritance; 
oral promises, oaths, and various contracts; and all manner of moral, ideological, 
and sexual crimes.  The church also claimed temporal jurisdiction over subjects 
and persons that also fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of one or more civil 
authorities.  The medieval church’s canon law that emerged from these sweeping 
jurisdictional claims was systematized in the massive Corpus Iuris Canonici, and 
was taught in every law faculty in Europe.  A vast hierarchy of church courts and 
officials administered the canon law in accordance with sophisticated new rules 
of procedure and evidence.  A vast network of ecclesiastical officials presided 
over the church's executive and administrative functions.  The medieval church 
was, in F.W. Maitland's famous phrase, the first true state in the West, the 
medieval canon law the first international law since the fall of Rome.12   
Early Protestants declared anathema on this regime.  Each individual 
stands directly before God, seeks God's gracious forgiveness of sin, and 
conducts life in accordance with the Bible and Christian conscience.  To the 
reformers, the Catholic canon law obstructed the individual's relationship with 
God, abridged their God-given freedom of conscience, and obscured simple 
biblical norms for right living.  The early Protestant reformers further taught that 
the church is at heart a community of saints, not a corporation of politics.  Its 
cardinal signs and callings are to preach the Word, to administer the sacraments, 
to catechize the young, to care for the needy.  To the reformers, the Catholic 
clergy's legal rule in Christendom obstructed the church's divine mission and 
 
11 Nicolaus Hemming, De lege naturae apodicta methodus (Wittenberg, 1563), reprinted in D. 
Nicolai Hemming ... Opuscula Theologica (Geneva, 1586). 
12 This is the central thesis of Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the 
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
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usurped the state's role as God's vice-regent.  Luther thus burned the canon law 
books in Wittenberg, and Henry VIII burned England’s legal bridges with Rome.  
Many other Protestant communities banished the bishops and closed the canon 
law courts. 
But it soon became clear to Protestants that Catholic canon law, once 
purged of its abusive provisions, remained a valuable and sophisticated source 
of Christian law for church and state alike.  Protestant theologians thus 
developed an innovative theory of the church to accommodate the canon law.  
The “invisible church” of the heavenly kingdom, they argued, might well be able 
to survive on the Bible alone, free from the accretions of the canon law.  But the 
visible church of the earthly kingdom, filled as it is with both sinners and saints, 
requires both biblical and canonical rules and procedures to be governed 
properly.  Medieval canon law, insofar as it extends biblical norms, is a proven 
norm for the governance of the visible church, and it should be used.  Protestant 
jurists, in turn, offered an innovative theory of the state and the sources of civil 
law.  The magistrate, as God's vice-regent of the community, is required to attend 
to both the civil and spiritual needs of his subjects.  He is to rule using Christian 
and equitable laws.  Again the canon law, as an exemplary form of Christian and 
equitable law, was an appropriate prototype on which to call. This new 
ecclesiology and jurisprudence, together, provided a sturdy rationale for the 
transplantation of canon law into Protestant lands and into Protestant law 
schools, where it remained until the twentieth century.  
The debate over the utility of canon law raised a fourth and deeper 
question about the usefulness of any law – whether natural, biblical, civil, or 
canon law -- in a Christian society dedicated to the freedom of the Christian.  The 
New Testament, after all, extols Christian freedom.  “For freedom, Christ has set 
us free.” “You were called to freedom.”  “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is 
freedom.”  “For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ has set [you] free from the law 
of sin and death.”  “You will know the truth, and the truth will make you free.”  
“You will be free indeed.”  You all have been given “the law of freedom” in Christ, 
"the glorious liberty of the children of God."  You must all now “live as free men” 
(Rom. 8:2, 21; John 8:32, 36, 1 Pet. 2:16).  If Christians truly are free, hasn’t all 
law been rendered useless?  No, most Protestants insisted.  Since even the most 
pious Christian remains sinner and saint, and since society embraces many who 
are more sinful than saintly, the law retains three important uses or functions for 
this life.  Beginning with Melanchthon and Calvin, Christoph Strohm and Mathias 
Schmoeckel show, the reformers distinguished (1) a civil or political use; (2) a 
theological or spiritual use; and (3) an educational or pedagogical use.   
First, the law has a civil use to restrain all persons from sinful and harmful 
conduct.  Threatened by dire sanctions, even the most sinful of persons will obey 
the basic commandments of the law against murder, theft, adultery, perjury and 
the like, thus yielding at least a modicum of public morality, order, and peace.  
Second, the law has a theological use to condemn sinful persons for their 
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violations and their inability to obey the law.  The law serves as a mirror to reflect 
on one’s depravity and be induced to seek God's gracious help in faith.  Third, 
the law has an educational use of teaching those who have already been saved 
the works that please God. The law teaches them not only the “public” or 
“external” morality” that is common to all persons, but also the “private” or 
“internal” morality that is becoming only of Christians.  The law teaches not only 
its letter but also its spirit.  It not only coerces persons against violence and 
violation, but also cultivates in them charity and love. It not only punishes harmful 
acts of killing, stealing, and adultery, but also prohibits evil thoughts of hatred, 
covetousness, and lust.  Through the exercise of this private morality, the saints 
glorify God, exemplify God's law, and impel other sinners to seek God's grace. 
To be effective, however, Professor Schmoeckel shows, each law for each 
community must be cast in “written, clear, and understandable codes” so that all 
members of that community “can use the law” to exercise “their freedom in a 
better way.” This was an early inspiration not only for the many new civil 
ordinances and legal treatises that were published in Protestant lands.  It was 
also one of the important catalysts for the legal codification movements of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, engineered by Jeremy Bentham and others.  
Modern legal codification was not just a product of scientific legal positivism; it 
was also a product of Protestant views of the pedagogical uses of law. 
It remains an open question whether modern-day Protestants can and will 
continue to engage legal questions of law with the same level of acuity as their 
forebearers, and whether they can contribute meaningfully to the emerging new 
interdisciplinary discussions among jurisprudence, theology, and science, 
following the exemplary efforts of Professor Welker in this volume.  In the first 
half of the twentieth century, great Protestant figures like Abraham Kuyper, Karl 
Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Reinhold Niebuhr did chart provocative new legal 
and political pathways for Protestantism, building on neo-Reformation models as 
well as the new scientific learning of their day.  But their successors have not 
developed a comprehensive legal and political program on the order of Roman 
Catholicism after the Second Vatican Council -- despite important advances 
made by the World Council of Churches and various world Evangelical 
gatherings.  After World War II, most European Protestants tended to fade from 
direct legal influence and engagement, and many North American Protestants 
tended to focus on hot button political issues, like abortion or prayer in schools, 
without developing a broader legal theory or political program.  
 
To be sure, Protestants have made some notable legal and political 
advances in recent times.  One was the civil rights movement of the 1950s-
1960s, led by the Baptist preacher Martin Luther King, Jr. and others, that helped 
to bring greater political and civil equality to African-Americans through a series 
of landmark statutes and cases.  Another was the rise of the Christian right in 
America in the 1970s to 1990s -- a broad conservative political and cultural 
campaign designed to revitalize public religion, restore families, reform schools, 
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reclaim unsafe neighborhoods, and support faith-based charities through new 
statutes and law suits.  Another has been the recent energetic involvement of 
Protestants and other Christian intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic 
engaged in campaigns of family law reform, human rights, environmental 
protection, and social welfare.  Another has been the rise of articulate public 
intellectuals like Wolfgang Huber and David Ford in Europe, and Robert Bellah 
and Jean Elshtain in North America, who from various perspectives have called 
fellow Protestants to take up anew the great legal, political, and social questions 
of our day.  Also promising has been the burgeoning new body of strong biblical 
exegesis and historical writing, exemplified in this volume, which aim to retrieve 
and reconstruct deep Protestant legal thinking.  Whether these recent 
movements are signposts for the development of a comprehensive new 
Protestant jurisprudence and political theology remains to be seen.    
